SOMMAIRE
From over function in finance : international institutional design by bricolage
The regulator`s conundrum. How market reflexivity limits fundamental financial reform
Cause for optimism? Financial sanctions and the rise of the Sino-North Korean border economy
Can foreign aid? Evidence from a cross-national survey of donor officials
Accumulating through food crisis? Farmers, commodity traders and the distributional politics of financialization
Veto players and the design of preferential trade agreements

SOMMAIRE
From over function in finance : international institutional design by bricolage
The regulator`s conundrum. How market reflexivity limits fundamental financial reform
Cause for optimism? Financial sanctions and the rise of the Sino-North Korean border economy
Can foreign aid? Evidence from a cross-national survey of donor officials
Accumulating through food crisis? Farmers, commodity traders and the distributional politics of financialization
Veto players and the design of preferential trade agreements